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Abstract 
Evaluating the security of hardware devices requires an organised assessment of which attacks the device might 
be exposed to. This in turn requires a structured body of knowledge about such attacks, classified in such a way 
that an evaluator can easily determine which attacks are applicable to a particular device. This paper presents 
such a collection, organised as a taxonomy of attacks on secure devices. The taxonomy covers many attacks 
applicable to hardware which are frequently overlooked in a software or protocol-centric evaluation.  
 
 
Keywords: Security Evaluation, Taxonomy, Attacks, Secure Devices, Survey, Smartcards, Domain Separation 
Devices, Hardware Security 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the spread of pervasive computing, and the increasing publicity given to security breaches in 
distributed systems, there is a growing need for trusted hardware devices. These devices include stand-
alone computers such as personal organisers, hardware implementation of parts of distributed systems, 
such as ATMs, smartcards and mobile phones, and domain separation devices such as data diodes, 
filters, data pumps and cryptography modules.  
 
In the context of national security, accepted standards for evaluating hardware devices mandate 
assessments with respect to vulnerabilities that may be exploited by an attacker (ITSEC 1991, 
Common Criteria 1999). 
 
Evaluating the security of these devices requires an organised assessment of which attacks the device 
may be exposed to, and a decision as to whether the device is in fact vulnerable to any of these attacks. 
This in turn requires a structured body of knowledge about attacks, classified in such a way that an 
evaluator can easily determine which attacks are applicable to a particular device. Here we do this by 
reviewing previous classifications of attacks, organising this knowledge into a structured taxonomy, 
and explaining how it can be used.  
 
CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS 
 
Previous Work 
Previous attempts to classify attacks have focussed on the techniques used, the resources of the 
attacker, or the goal of the attack. Our taxonomy below subsumes these existing classifications. For 
instance, Kommerling et al. (1999) identify four major attack categories:   
 
• Software Attacks ‘exploit security vulnerabilities found in the protocols, cryptographic 
algorithms or their implementation’.  
• Eavesdropping Techniques ‘monitor the analog characteristics of all supply and interface 
connections, and any other electromagnetic radiation produced by the processor’. 
• Fault Generation Techniques ‘use abnormal environmental conditions to generate 
malfunctions in the processor that provide additional access’.  
• Micro-probing Techniques ‘access the chip surface directly’. 
 
Abraham et al. (1991), in their analysis of the IBM Transaction Security System, identify three classes 
of ‘adversary’ (attacker), and three forms of attack: 
 
• Class I adversaries are labelled as clever outsiders. They are intelligent, but lack knowledge 
about the system, and have access to only moderately sophisticated equipment. Class I 
adversaries often try to take advantage of existing weaknesses in a system rather than creating 
new ones.  
• Class II adversaries are knowledgeable insiders. They are highly educated, and may have 
detailed understanding of parts of the system. In particular they have potential access to most 
of the system. Class II adversaries often have access to highly sophisticated tools. 
• Class III adversaries are funded organisations. They are able to assemble teams (possibly 
including Class II agents), backed by great funding resources. They are capable of designing 
sophisticated attacks, and use the most sophisticated tools. 
 
These classes are useful for placing ‘reasonableness’ bounds on device evaluation. Abraham et al. 
(1991) argue that the system under evaluation should be secure against Class I and Class II 
adversaries, but need not be secure from Class III adversaries.  
 
Abraham et al. also put forward a classification based on attack type: 
 
• Microcircuit attacks encompass both micro-probing and fault generation. They are 
equivalent to the `micro-probing techniques’ of Kommerling et al. (1999). 
• Counterfeiting attacks involve an attacker replacing the secure hardware. A successful 
counterfeit may require a supporting attack to obtain the data necessary for a successful 
impersonation of the device.  
• Eavesdropping attacks involve collection of radiated signals. They are equivalent to the 
Kommerling’s eavesdropping attacks. 
 
Howard (2000) introduces the ‘STRIDE’categorisation of threats: 
 
• Spoofing Identity: Illegally using another user’s authentication information.  
• Tampering with Data: Malicious modification of data.  
• Repudiation: Plausibly denying having performed an action.  
• Information Disclosure: Exposing information to individuals who are not supposed to see it.  
• Denial of Service: Denying service to valid users.  
• Elevation of Privilege: An unprivileged user gaining privileged access.  
 
 
Our Taxonomy 
Based on this preceding work, we now assemble a structured taxonomy of attacks. In particular, we 
use the attack categories of Kommerling et al. (1990) as a basis for defining the access required by an 
attacker, and Howard’s (2000) threat categorisation to define the consequences of an attack.  
 
The basis of our taxonomy is a matrix dimensioned by the access required by the attacker, and the 
action taken by the attacker. Within each cell of the matrix, we further differentiate attacks by 
considering the consequence of the attack, and the method used for the attack.  
 
In classifying the access required, we consider whether the attacker: 
• possesses the device – i.e., can open the device and break tamper seals with impunity; 
• handles the device physically, but cannot break tamper seals on the device; 
• approaches the proximity of the device, but cannot touch the device; or 
• interfaces with the device over a network, and can communicate data with the device from 
either an insecure or a secure domain.   
 
We recognise that where the fourth category of access applies, an attack on hardware is 
indistinguishable from an attack on software. Extensive literature already exists on such attacks, 
including replay attacks, middleman attacks, datatype attacks and passive cryptoanalysis. For 
examples, see Bieber (1994), Aslam (1996), and Syverson (1994). Therefore, this survey will 
concentrate on those attacks which are specific to secure hardware; i.e., where the attacker is able to 
approach or lay hands on the device itself.  
 
In classifying the action of the attacker, we assume that a legitimate user of the device (or in multi-
level systems, a user at a particular access level), is authenticated by a key. This key may be an actual 
cryptographic key, or may be a password or biometric measure. The attacker thus seeks to:  
• recover a key; 
• defeat authentication, for example by setting a key to a known value, or by inducing 
someone else to supply the key; 
• avoid authentication, and access data directly; or 
• deny service, without authentication. 
 
Attacks falling within the same cell of the matrix are differentiated based on the consequence of the 
attack, and the specific method used. Examples of specific methods are described below.  
 
The consequence of the attack may be: 
• modification of data stored on the device; 
• reading of data stored on the device; 
• observation of data transmitted through the device; 
• compromise of cryptography used by the device; or 
• service denied to users of the device. 
 
Note that denial of service is both an action and a consequence. This represents the fact that most 
attacker goals above are in fact intermediate steps towards some larger aim, whilst denial of service is 
an end in itself. Note also that where the attacker is able to approach a secure device, denial of service 
seldom requires more than simply unplugging the device, or attacking it with a hammer. This survey 
will concentrate on attacks which aim to compromise data or cryptographic protocols.  
 
Having defined the basic elements of our taxonomy, we next show how they are related by putting 
them in the context of access / goal / method trees.  
 
ATTACKS WITH APPROACH ACCESS 
Approach Access is defined as being able to monitor the external characteristics of a device, but not to 
touch the device itself (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Classification of Attacks with Approach Access 
 
Attacks with Approach Access for the Purpose of Key Recovery 
Attacks involving passive observation of external characteristics of a device are termed eavesdropping 
attacks, also sometimes called side-channel attacks.  The four main observable parameters are power-
usage, electromagnetic radiation, device timing, and optical emissions. 
 
Power Analysis 
Kocher (1999) discusses two categories of side-channel attack which analyse the power usage of the 
device. In a simple power-analysis, the attacker uses detailed knowledge of the device to identify 
which instructions are being executed based on their power signatures. In a differential power-
analysis, the attacker uses a hypothetical model of the device, and refines this model with statistical 
analysis of the power usage of the device.  
 
Chari et al. (1999) report experimental results demonstrating the feasibility of differential power 
attacks on smart cards using the ‘twofish’ algorithm, and discuss the vulnerability of a number of 
encryption algorithms to power analysis attacks. 
 
Oswald et al. (2003) survey a selection of published side-channel attacks on various algorithms. These 
include power analysis attacks on modular exponentiation and elliptic-curve cryptosystems. Oswald 
notes that whilst simple power analysis attacks are often not feasible, differential power analysis 
attacks are frequently effective, even despite countermeasures.  
 
Electromagnetic Radiation Analysis 
A related type of attack monitors the electromagnetic leakage from a device to reconstruct 
cryptographic material. These attacks are commonly termed TEMPEST after the US Military program 
to counter the problem. Kuhn et al. (1998) surveys the classified and public history of TEMPEST 
research, noting the particular hazards of video displays and radiation leakage across red/black 
boundaries of multi-level systems. 
 
Rao (2001) reports on practical experiments using electromagnetic monitoring to extract encryption 
keys from smartcards. These show that the electromagnetic side channel reveals similar information to 
power analysis, but in the certain cases can leak significantly more information. Anderson (2001) 
refers to an attack of this nature that can recover card and PIN data from a cash machine at a distance 
of eight metres. He also describes a class of attack where a device modulates currents induced by 
nearby radiofrequency equipment such as mobile phones.  
 
Timing Analysis 
The third type of side-channel attack involves the time taken to complete critical operations.  Kocher 
(1996) provides a detailed attack strategy for timing crypto-analysis of several commonly used 
algorithms. He notes that by measuring the time taken to perform private key operations, attackers can 
recover the input to those operations, thereby determining the private key.  
 
Optical Observation 
Approach access also allows a form of attack where the plain-text key is intercepted before or during 
input to the encryption module. The most basic such attack is termed shoulder-surfing (Loughry 
2002), where the attacker observes the user as they input a password or PIN. Loughry (2002) and 
Kuhn (2002) discuss the feasibility of such attacks, as well as other attacks based on direct 
observations of optical data, such as reading and decoding LED status indicators. 
 
Attacks with Approach Access for the Purpose of Defeating Authentication 
Radiofrequency Attack 
Clark (1998) discusses the security of large hardware devices such as ATMs and EFTPOS terminals. 
He notes that an attacker could use a directional antenna and a radio-frequency generator to produce a 
large electromagnetic field, forcing the internal random key generators of the device to latch-up and 
produce predictable keys. 
 
ATTACKS WITH HANDLE ACCESS 
Handle Access is defined as being able to manipulate the environment of the device, including setting 
its inputs and monitoring its outputs (Figure 3). Handle access does not allow opening the device to 
modify its operation. 
 
Attacks with Handle Access for the Purpose of Key Recovery 
Fault Analysis 
Anderson et al. (1996, 2001) describe a number of physical attacks on secure devices, intended to 
cause transient faults in the behaviour of the device.  Such attacks include adjusting the input voltage 
of the device to very high or very low levels, and adjusting the clock frequency of the device. Boneh et 
al. (1997) discuss how transient hardware faults can be used to break common public key encryption 
schemes. Biham et al. (1997) discuss a similar technique called differential fault analysis for attacking 
private key encryption devices. These are also termed Bell-core attacks. Zheng et al. (1996) describe a 
technique whereby physical stress is used to cause a pseudo-random number generator to produce 
predictable output, thereby compromising a private key.  
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Figure 3 Classification of Attacks with Handle Access 
Attacks with Handle Access for the Purpose of Defeating Authentication 
Environmental Attacks 
Environmental Attacks operate by subjecting the device to extremes of temperature or radiation, 
typically to erase data stored on the device.  Anderson et al. (1996) refer to using ultraviolet radiation 
to erase EPROMS, thereby restoring phone-cards to their original value. Anecdotes are told of phone-
cards which could be recharged by irradiating them in a microwave oven, but there are no credible 
references for this example.  
 
The consequence of environmental attacks may be to modify data directly, or to defeat authentication 
by setting a key to a known value. 
 
 
ATTACKS WITH POSSESSION 
Possession, illustrated in Figure 4, is defined as being able to completely manipulate the device, 
including subjecting the device to sophisticated scanning, or modifying the device. This may be done 
to devices still in use, or done destructively to learn how a particular class of devices work.  
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Figure 4 Classification of Attacks with Possession 
 
Attacks Requiring Possession for the Purpose of Key Recovery 
Micro-probing 
Handschuh et al. (1999) discuss the situation where an attacker can directly read one or more of the 
execution bits of a device. This is termed a micro-probing attack. They show that by observing a few 
bits of data, an attacker can recover information on the secret key being used by the device. 
 
Kingpin (2000) discusses an attack against the iKey 1000 USB token device, where the key can be 
read directly from an exposed part of the circuit.  
 
Huang (2002) reports on an attack using micro-probing to recover the key used to authenticate the 
Microsoft XBox boot loader.  
 
Reverse Engineering 
Some devices are vulnerable to simply removing the data chip from the device, and using nitric acid to 
remove the protective coating of the chip (Anderson 1996). More professional techniques may involve 
complete reverse engineering of the device by successively analysing and removing layers of the chip 
(Blythe 1993). 
 
Further sophisticated techniques include using ultraviolet laser to monitor voltages on the chip 
(Wiesenfeld 1990), and infrared laser to observe transistor voltages (Ajluni 1995).  
 
Laser Cutting 
Anderson et al. (1997) discuss related attacks where laser-cutter microscopes are used to damage the 
circuit in such a way that the key can eventually be recovered.  
 
 
Attacks Requiring Possession for the Purpose of Defeating Authentication 
Overwrite Attack 
An overwrite attack replaces the key stored on the hardware with a known value (Anderson 1997)  
 
Kingpin (2000) discusses EEPROM overwrite attacks against the eToken and iKey 1000 USB token 
devices.  
 
Attacks Requiring Possession for the Purpose of Avoiding Authentication 
Reconnecting Test Circuitry 
Bovelander (1998) reports on commercial evaluations of smartcards using intrusive techniques. These 
include probing, scanning electron microscope analysis, and focussed ion beam analysis. A reported 
example of such an attack is the original version of the Mondex cashcard, which was broken by 
identifying and reconnecting test circuitry (Brown 1997). This attack allowed data on the card to be 
directly altered.  
 
Glave (1998) reports on Dutch hackers recharging phone cards by directly accessing values stored in 
EEPROMs.  
 
ATTACKS WITH INTERFACE ACCESS 
Interface access attacks focus not on the device itself, but on the protocols that the device uses to 
communicate with the outside world (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Classification of Attacks with Interface Access 
 
Attacks Requiring Interface Access for the Purpose of Recovering a Key 
Cryptanalysis 
A cryptanalysis attack monitors traffic to and from the device in order to recover the key used to 
encode that traffic. Brickell et al. (1991) surveys a number of such attacks against various 
cryptographic schemes. He points out that most of the cryptosystems that had been publicly proposed 
in the previous decade had been subsequently broken. He claims that the ‘one-time pad’ is the only 
cryptosystem known to be unconditionally secure. 
 
Attacks Requiring Interface Access for the Purpose of Defeating Authentication 
A man-in-the-middle attack intercepts and forges messages in such a way as to induce the device to 
communicate using a key known to the attacker (Clark et al. 1996).  
 
Replay Attacks 
In replay attacks (Syverson 1994), the attacker stores messages, and forwards them at unexpected 
times. One such attack type, a freshness attack, involves replay of messages from previous protocol 
sessions. Another type, run internal replay attacks, involve replay of messages from within the same 
session. A third type, parallel session replay attacks, involve replay of messages from a concurrent 
protocol session.  
 
Type-flaw attacks 
In type-flaw attacks (Clark et al. 1996) the internal structure of messages is altered in order to induce 
the device to accept an insecure key, by taking advantage of the ability of certain fields in the message 
to be interpreted in different ways.  
 
Attacks Requiring Interface Access for the Purpose of Avoiding Authentication 
Buffer-overrun attacks 
Interface attacks for avoiding authentication are highly implementation specific, as they require 
mistakes in design or configuration of the device. The broadest class of such attacks are buffer-overrun 
attacks (Aleph One 1996) where the attacker is able to use carefully crafted inputs to cause insecure 
operation of the device.  
 
Covert Channels 
A covert channel is a mechanism via which information may be deliberately communicated between 
parts of a system at different security levels. We distinguish between eavesdropping attacks, where the 
attacker has proximity access to the device but no interface access to the device, and covert channels 
where the attacker can manipulate data within the secure domain of the system.  
 
Note that passive side-channels such as power and radiation can be converted into covert channels by 
prompting device behaviours which exaggerate the observable characteristics of the device.  
 
Covert channels are classified as storage channels, timed channels, and mixed channels (Moskowitz 
1994).  
 
A storage channel is one where the unclassified part of the system (called ‘Low’) receives different 
signals in response to its actions depending on the state of the classified system (‘High’). For example, 
a High process might adjust the access permissions of a file as a means of conveying a message to a 
Low process, which can see the permissions but not read the file.  
 
A timing channel is one where a Low process receives the same signals, but with different response 
times depending on the behaviour of a High process. A mixed channel is where a Low process 
receives different signals with different response times.      
 
 
Attacks Requiring Interface Access for the Purpose of Denial of Service 
Semantic and brute force attacks 
Denial of service attacks using the interface are either semantic attacks or brute force attacks 
(Mirkovic 2002). A semantic attack sends incorrectly formed packets or messages to the device in 
order to consume resources. A brute force attack sends large numbers of correctly formed messages.  
 
USE OF THE TAXONOMY 
Now that we have established the taxonomy, we take a brief look at its application. 
 
Classification and Understanding of Attacks 
To ensure that a device is secure against malicious interference, we need to analyse and understand the 
ways in which the device can be attacked. The taxonomy thus facilitates understanding by categorising 
and grouping attacks that share similar characteristics.  
 
The taxonomy also serves as a realistic overview of the challenge that faces designers of secure 
devices. It is important that a design has mechanisms to defend against the entire spectrum of attacks 
which may be used against it.  
 
Determining an Attack Profile for Evaluation 
 
The matrix of Figure 1 can be used to determine the threats extant for a particular device. These 
threats form an attack profile which serves as a checklist against which the device may be evaluated. 
Note that the attack profile for a device may change across the device’s lifecycle. A device may be 
attacked during manufacture or distribution, by its owner, by third parties during use, or after disposal.  
 
A column of the matrix can be eliminated if the planned usage of the device prevents an attacker from 
gaining that form of access. 
 
For example, for an automatic teller machine, it might be assumed that a customer will not have 
handle or possess access to the machine’s internals, whereas a technician might have handle but not 
possess access. For a smart card, the holder of the card has complete access, whereas a card reader has 
only interface, approach and handle access.  
 
Rows of the matrix may also be eliminated. For example, if data is not protected by cryptography, then 
the rows corresponding to recover key and defeat authentication can be removed. Alternately, denial 
of service may not be a threat for some devices, so long as the data remains secure.  
 
All of the remaining cells in the table are potential threats against which the device must be examined 
for vulnerability. The attack methods relevant to each cell in the table can be derived from the trees in 
Figures 2 to 5. Individual attacks may be eliminated from the profile if they do not serve an attack goal 
relevant for the particular device, or if the resources required are too expensive for any perceived 
threat.  
 
For example, Figure 6 shows the attack profile for a cryptographic device. The operating environment 
for this device ensures that an attacker cannot possess the device. Further, it has been determined that 
denial of service is not a threat for this particular application of the device.  
 
 
Note that this matrix focuses attention on those attacks which are relevant to the device in this 
particular mode of operation. 
 
Improving Security Technology 
Krsul (1997) argues:  
 
Virtually every field where failure can be catastrophic has recognised that accumulation of 
information about failures is critical to the stepwise refinement of technology, particularly when the 
systems that fail are highly complex. 
 
This is particularly true in the security field, where institutional reluctance to reveal information about 
attacks, failures and vulnerabilities has thinned the public knowledge of realistic attack information 
(Anderson 1994). As a result, most of the literature on attacks focuses on protocol vulnerabilities 
(Syverson 1994, Rice 2000), with little information about whether these attacks pose practical threats 
to real devices. 
 
By classifying and organising information about attacks, and linking theoretical attack methods with 
reports of experiments and actual vulnerabilities, it is hoped that the above taxonomy will aid in the 
identification of new attacks, and in the development of techniques for addressing existing and future 
attacks.  
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